Merton and Perold (1993) offered a framework for determining risk capital in a financial fL, m based on the cost of the implicit guarantee the firm provides to its subsidiaries to make up any operating shortfall. Merton and Perold assume the price of such guarantees is observable from the market at large. For an insurer, this may not be a realistic assumption. This paper proposes an insurance-specific framework for determining the cost of those parental guarantees, and utilizing that cost in pricing and portfolio mix evaluation. An insurer's capital is treated as a shared asset, with the insurance contracts in the portfolio having simultaneous fights to access potentially all that shared capital. By granting underwriting capacity, an insurer's management team is implicitly issuing a set of options to draw upon the common capital pool--similar in structure to letters of credit (LOC), except they are not loans but grants. The paper will (i) discuss the valuation of parental guarantees, beginning with Merton and Perold; ('fi) treat insurer capital as a shared asset and explore the dual nature of insurer capital usage; (iii) offer a method for determining insurer capital usage cost;, and (iv) demonstrate how this method could be used for product pricing and portfolio mix evaluation using economic value added concepts.
VALUATION OF PARENTAL GUARANTEES
(M-P) define risk capital as the amount required to guarantee payment of an asset or liability. In their first section, they present three related examples of a financial firm, Mortgage Bank or "MB," making a risky one-year bridge loan of $100M, financed by the issuing of a note to a note holder ("NH"). The only risk in any of these cases is the possible default of repayment by the bridge loan recipient ("BL"). They posit three outcome scenarios:
• Anticipated (A): bridge loan is repaid with interest of 20% at maturity in one year--e.g., for a loan of $100M, the repayment would be $120M; • Disaster (13): amount repaid at maturity is only half that of Anticipated; • Catastrophe (C): amount repaid at maturity is zero.
They discuss three cases, which differ mainly by which party bears the ultimate cost of any default. Under their Case 1, the note holder wishes to purchase a default-free note. The note holder is insulated from the default risk of BL by MB's purchase of"note insurance" from a third-party guarantor. The free market cost of this is asstlmedto be $5M. It is the cost of this guarantee that M-P considers to be risk capital. Merton and Perold never discuss the determination of that $5M price tag. They assume it to be a given figure, observable from the market.
"When an insurance company writes a policy, a premium is received. A portion of this policy can be viewed as the loss component. When a particular policy incurs a loss, the company can look to three places to pay the loss. The first place is the loss component (together with the investment income earned) of the policy itself. In many cases, this will not be sufficient to pay the loss. The second source is unused loss components of other policies. In most cases, these two sources will be sufficient to pay the losses. In some years, it will not, and the company will have to look to a third source, the surplus, to pay the losses." (p. 124) The only market from which an insurer might be able m observe the value of a guarantee is the reinsurance market. However, this market is limited, with relatively low numbers of participants, and a great diversity among products. A reinsurance valuation exercise is similar to that for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, in that it requires proprietary (as opposed to public) information, as well as a specific valuation methodology. Also, reinsurers, the liability holders of last resort, do not have the luxury of market prices for the guarantees they offer their portfolio segments. This suggests that, at a minimum, reinsurers must have an internal valuation framework of their own. It is argued here that an insurer must value the guarantee it provides to its portfolio, either explicitly or implicitly. This paper proposes one such insurance-specific valuation methodology for the insurer parental guarantee. It is based upon the following premises:
• An insurer's capital is a shared asset, with all insurance contracts in the portfolio having simultaneous rights to access potentially all that shared capital.
• The impacts on an insurer from underwriting a contract are (i) the occupation of some of its finite underwriting capacity over a period of time (as determined by required capital calculations), and (ii) the extension of a guarantee by the firm to the contract holder to fulfill legitimate claims. These impacts represent distinct types of usage of the insurer's capital.
• Each distinct capital usage type will result in a unique charge: a capacity occupation cost and a capital consumption cost. The capacity occupation cost is an upfront cost which is a function of premium and expected reserve balances. Thus it can be treated as a fixed cost. The capital consumption cost is a variable cost depending on the amount of shortfall, which is scenario-specific. Therefore, its expected value over all possible contract outcome scenarios is used.
• The sum of these two costs will be called the capital usage cost, and ~ be treated as an expense in the contract pricing evaluation. The contribution to the insurer of a contract is therefore not a return on capital, like the ratio of expected profit to allocated capital, but rather the profit less the capital usage cost. • The recommended decision metric then becomes economic value added or EVA 1, a means of risk-adjusting return by subtracting the opportunity cost of capital.
The paper will proceed by framing insurer capital as a shared asset, exploring the dual nature of insurer capital usage, proposing a method for determining insurer capital usage cost, and demonstrating how this method could be used for product pricing and portfolio mix evaluation using economic value added concepts.
INSURER CAPITAL IS A SHARED ASSET
Shared assets or resources are entities conjointly owned by a community or group, for the use of their members. Shared assets can bc scarce and essential public entities (e.g., reservoirs, fisheries, national forests), or desirable private entities (e.g., hotels, golf courses, bcach houses). The access to and use of the assets is controlled and regulated by their owners; this control and regulation is essential to prcscrve the asset for future use. Examples of controls include usage rules (standards of care), limitations on the number of uscrs (e.g., occupancy limits in a restaurant, sx~nmer limits at a pool), limitations on duration of usage (e.g., campsites at national parks), and limitations on amount of consumption (e.g., tons of fish taken from a fishery). It is particularly critical with essential assets that over-use by some members not compromise the future viability of the asset for the entire group. This a~regation risk is a common characteristic of shared asset usage, since shared assets typically have more members who could potentially use the asset than the asset can safely bear. Owners cannot count on individual users taking stcps to preserve the asset. These users havc their own incentivcs, and due to limited perspective and information, cannot see the implications of their individual actions upon the larger whole. Non-consumptive use differs from consumptive use in several fundamental ways:
Consumptive and Non-Consumptive Uses
• Non-consumptive use involves temporary, limited transfer of control.
• Non-consumptive use is intended to be non-depletive--proper use of the asset leaves it intact for subsequent users.
• Non-consumptive use has a time element. Users occupy or borrow the asset for a period of time, then return it to the owner's control.
Examples of non-consumptive use include boating on a reservoir, hiking in a national forest, playing on a golf course, or renting a car or hotel room. The main aggregation concern from non-consumptive use relates to either capacity limitations or insufficient maintenance. Capacity limitation examples include caps on the number of water ski boats allowed on a lake, the number of campsites at national parks, or the number of available tee times at a golf course.
Shared assets are typically used in only one of the two manners. However, some shared assets can be used in either a consumptive or non-consumptive manner, depending on the situation. A good example is the renting of a hotel room. The intended use of the hotel These terms are used extensively in areas such as "gate* and wildlife management. See Appendix C of the United States' Environmental Protection Agency's "Interim Economic Guidance for Water Quality Standards," www.e'o~t~ov/watersdcnce/econ/anr~cndc.html. Another good reference is the "Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the'Sustainable Use of Biodive*sity," Convention on Migratory Species, www.cms.int/bodies/COP/ctm8/documcnts/meefin~ docs/en/Inf 15 AAPG Sustainable Use.ndf.
Casualty Actuarial Society Forum, FaLl 2006 room is benign occupancy--the guest stays in the room, leaves it intact, and after cleaning the room is ready for subsequent rental. However, ira guest leaves the water running and floods their floor, or falls asleep with a lit cigarette and bums down a wing of the hotel, their use has become consumptive, because the capacity itself has been destroyed. The hotelier must rebuild the damaged rooms (invest additional capital) before the rooms can again be rented.
Insurer Capacity
Insurers sell promises to pay claims, so legitimate counterparty standing (i.e., claims paying rating) is vital. Other factors enter into a rating decision, but a key variable is the capital adequaq ratio (CAR) . Different rating agencies use different approaches, but essentially CAR is the ratio of actual capital to required capital. Typically the rating agency formulas generate required capital from three broad sources: premiums, reserves, and assets. Current year underwriting activity will generate required premium capital. As that business ages, reserves will be established, which will generate required reserve capital. As those reserves run off, the amount of generated required reserve capital diminishes, eventually disappearing once the reserve balance reaches zero.
There are usually minimum CAR levels associated with each rating level. Thus, if an insurer has a desired rating, a given amount of actual capital corresponds to a maximum amount of rating agency required capital. This means required premium capital is an excellent proxy for underuviting capad{y. It represents an externally imposed constraint on the amount of new business that can be written. Since total required capital consists of portions attributable to premium, reserves and assets, the maximum required premium capital is also a function of the amount of required reserve capital.
In summary, an insurer's actual capital creates underwriting capacity, and underwriting activity (either past or present) ties up or occupies potentially available underwriting capacity.
Consumptive and Non-Consumptive Use of Insurer Capital
Per the rating agency required capital formula, the presence of either premium balances (representing current year underwriting) or reserve balances (representing previous years' underwriting) results in required capital being calculated. This temporarily reduces the amount of underwriting capacity available for other underwriting uses. Being temporary, it is similar to capacity occupancy, a non-consumptive use of the shared asset.
Capital consumption occurs when reserves are increased. This involves a transfer of funds from the capital account to the reserve account, and eventually out of the fm'n as claims payments. P-P also introduced this concept:
"The entire surplus is available to every policy to pay losses in excess of the aggregate loss component. Some policies are more likely to create this need than others are, even if the expected loss portions are equal. Roughly speaking, for policies with similar expected losses, we would expect the policies with a Large variability of possible results to require more contributions from surplus to pay the losses. We can envision an insurance company instituting a charge for the access to the surplus. This charge should depend, not just on the likelihood that surplus might be needed, but on the amount of such a surplus calL" (p. 124)
Insurance Capital as a Shared Asset
The two distinct impacts of underwriting an insurance portfolio on the insurer in total are therefore:
(i) ® Certain occupation of underwriting capacity for a period of time, and Possible consumption of capital.
This "bi-polar" capital usage is structurally similar to a line of credit (LOC) as issued by banks. The dual impacts on a bank of issuing a LOC are:
(i) @ Certain occupation of capacity to issue LOC's, for the term of the LOC, and Possible loan to the LOC holder.
Banks receive income for the issuance of LOC's in two ways:
(i) ® An access fee (i.e., option fee) for the right to draw upon the credit line, and Loan payback with interest.
This dual form of payments for the dual nature of usage will be adapted for the unique characteristics of insurance.
THE COST OF USING INSURER CAPITAL
The cost of the insurer's parental guarantee therefore has two pieces: (i) a Capacity Occupation Cost, similar to the LOC access fee, and (ii) a Capital Call Cost, similar to the paybac k costs of accessing an LOC, but adjusted for the facts that the call is not for a loan but for a permanent transfer, and that the call destroys future underwriting capacity.
(i) Capacity Occupation Cost
The capacity occupation cost is an opportunity cost, compensating the firm for preclusion of other opportunities. It can be thought of as a minimum risk-adjusted hurdle rate. It will be the product of an opportunity cost rate and the amount of required capital generated over the active life of the contract. In continuous time, the formula would be: • %p is the "instantaneous" opportunity cost of capacity (similar to the force of interest); and • RC, is the required capital amount for the segment or contract at each point in time t, with t going from 0 (contract inception) to T (final resolution of all payments).
Rating agency required capital formulas are a discrete approximation of the continuous time situation:
{ 7~ RC~}*rovv
RCiis the required capital for time period i. For/=-1, it would be a function of premium; for all subsequent periods, it will be a function of reserves.
(ii) Capital Call Cost
Let v be the random variable representing the present value at inception of all insurance cash flows associated with an insurance contract--premium, expenses and loss payments (but not required capital). For simplicity assumep(v) is the discrete distribution with possible outcomes vj, i = 1 to n.
Let f(x) be the capital call cost function that charges for a particular capital call. We will assume that a capital call is necessary when the present value of insurance flows v I falls below zero. The magnitude of capital call for outcome vj would be -min(O, vj), which will be denoted s i for shortfall of outcome i, a non-negative number. The cost of a capital call for outcome i will be denoted f(s~). The expected cost of capital calls over all outcomes would be:
n ~p, * f(s,) (3.4)
I=I
The form of f(s I) can be determined in part based on an understanding that a capital call destroys future underwriting capadty. Therefore, any call cost function should at least equal the amount of the call (payback of the capital grant). It should also compensate for lost opportunity cost. In this case, the des~oyed capacity would need to be replenished by some means (e.g., recoupment from the product line's future returns, or capital infusion from parent). Whatever the source, the lost capacity could cost the firm the equivalent ofmyears of "capacity downtime," what one might call an inconvenience premium. Such an understanding leads to one possible means for determining the capital call cost funcdon f(s,):
The determination of m could be based on the volatility of a product's pricing cycles--that is, the likelihood that temporary capital impairment would lead to missed opportunity to write business at higher price levels.
Economic Value Added (EVA)
EVA, a registered trademark of Stem Stewart & Co., is a powerful metric used in financial analysis. The formula for EVA is:
EVA = NPV Return -Opportunity Cost of Capital
Insurance Capita/as a Shared Asset EVA is typically expressed as an amount. An activity with a positive EVA is said to "add value," while one with a negative EVA "destroys value."
EVA is simple to calculate using the shared asset framework: EVA = NPV Return -Opportunity Cost of Capital Usage EVA balances both risk and reward, and will be used as the key decision variable in the application examples to follow.
Application in Reinsurance Contract Evaluation
This section will demonstrate the application of this approach to two reinsurance contracts.
Both examples use the following key parameters:
• ropp = 10%
• m=5
• f(s) = 5"10°/o = 500/0
High Layer Property Excess of Loss Contract Consider a high-layer contract, with a 2% chance of incurring a loss (i.e., 1 in 50 years). When a loss occurs, it is assumed to be a full limit loss. Example 1 shows the details:
Example 1 Property Catastrophe Contract

Comments
(1) Premium $ 500,000 = 5% Net Rate on line (2) Limit $ 10,000,000
I Capaclty Occupation Cost Since this is a short payment tail line, there are no required capital charges for reserves, and discounting is ignored for simplicity. The two pieces of the capital usage cost are calculated separately. The EVA formula is straightforward, being NPV minus capital usage cost.
Longer Tail Excess of Loss Contract
Now consider a high-layer excess of loss contract on a liability product, with the same probability of loss, severity profile, limit, and premium, but a five-year payout. Example 2 shows the calculation details. The major differences between Examples 1 and 2:
Example 2 Longer Tail Excess of Loss Contract
• The Capacity Occupation Cost now includes charges for required capital needs over time on reserves. This increases the capacity occupation fee from $25,000 to $52,423.
• The loss payment has been discounted at 5% (the assumed default-free rate) for five years (assumed payment delay). This reduces the expected capital call cost from $95,000 to $73,353.
• The total capital usage cost stayed about the same, changing from $120,000 to $125,776.
• The EVA increased from $180,000 to $217,519. However, this is partly due to the premium being held constant at $500,000. The market price for the longer payment tail would likely have factored in the loss discounting. The model uses 100 independent scenarios drawn from these distributions, each of which is stored on its own row in the spreadsheet. Premium is assumed equal to expected losses plus a profit margin (expressed as a percentage of premium). Expenses are ignored.
Deviations from Mean
For simplicity, this model ignores discounting. The capital calls are therefore assumed to happen under those scenarios where a segment's losses are higher than expected. Section 2 of the model subtracts scenario loss from expected loss by segment. This amount is called "dtviatio#from mean, "denoted d~ for scenario i and segment/'.
Capital Usage Cost Calculation
This Here are detailed descriptions of each element:
The rating agency required premium capital formula is a factor (40%) multiplied by premium. rop~ = 10%. m = 3 years. Capital Call Cost Factor f= 3*10% = 30%.
The Capital Usage Cost is calculated in the following steps:
• For scenario i, portfolio shortfall s i = -min(0,d~).
• For scenario i, portfoSo capital call cost c i = f.s I .
• Allocate c i back to segment using the RMK algodthm. The RMK algorithm is a conditional risk allocation method developed by Ruhm, Mango and Kreps (2004) '.
• For scenario i, segmentj shortfall s o. = -min(0, d~).
3
• For scenario/, the sum of segment shortfalls si = E[-min(O,d#)]. j=l 3 It is conceptually similar to concepts in Buhlmann, "An Economic Premium Principle," A~TN B#lletin 11 (1980) , p. 52-60. Ruhm and Mango (2003) , and Kreps (2004) , independently derived the approach, known as "RMK" for short. Kreps derived it under the name "riskiness leverage models"; Ruhm and Mango derived it under the name "Risk Charge Based on Conditional Probability." The method begins at the aggregate or portfolio level for evaluating risk, and allocates the total portfolio risk charge by each component's contribution to total portfolio risk. The result is an internally consistent allocation of diversification benefits.
